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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
SEVERANCE DAMAGE IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
"[Nior shall private property be taken without just compensa-
tion."' Thus the Florida Constitution, and in similar terms the con-
stitutions of forty-six other states2 and of the United States,3 limits
government in its interference with the quiet enjoyment of private
property.4 It is not to be inferred, however, that every deprivation of
private property by a sovereign is compensable; the nebulous area
of a state's police power is generally immune from such a constitu-
tional requirement. s If the police power exception is inapplicable,
exercise of the sovereign's power of eminent domain 6 calls for strict
enforcement of the constitutional requirement of compensation for
the taking of private property.7
The extent of the remedy afforded under these constitutional pro-
visions varies with the phraseology employed by the framers as well
as with the construction adopted by the courts. Nevertheless, certain
principles are inherent in all of these provisions: a taking of a tract
of land entitles the owner to compensation for the value of the prop-
erty actually taken; when only a part of a tract of land is taken the
owner is entitled not only to recovery for the value of the part taken
but also to compensation for injury to the remaining area.s This
latter type of injury, peculiar to the partial taking situation, is aptly
termed "severance damage.""
SEVERANCE DAMAGE DISTINGUISHED FROM CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE
It is important to differentiate between severance damage and con-
sequential damage, in view of the effect of the distinction upon com-
'FLA. CONsT. Decl. of Rights §12.
"All states except North Carolina.
'U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So.2d 684, 690 (Fla. 1954) (dictum).
51 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §1.42 (3d ed. 1950).
6Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property for public
use without the owner's consent. I NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §1.11 (3d ed. 1950).
7See Scott v. Toledo, 36 Fed. 385 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888); Moody v. Jacksonville,
T. & K.W.R.R., 20 Fla. 597 (1884). The term "property" is broad enough to en-
compass both realty and personalty, but the eminent domain cases deal almost
exclusively with appropriation of realty.
'E.g., Worth v. West Palm Beach, 101 Fla. 868, 132 So. 689 (1931); St. Louis
v. Paramount Shoe Mfg. Co., 237 Mo. App. 200, 168 S.W.2d 149 (1943); New Dells
Lumber Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 222 Wis. 264, 268 N.W. 243 (1936).
9United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1942) (dictum).
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pensability. Although all damage may be termed "consequential" in
that it follows from some act of the defendant, a more restricted use
of the term is made in an eminent domain context. The Florida
Court has employed the term "consequential damage" to refer to in-
jury resulting to land no part of which has been physically appro-
priated;1 it will be so used in this note.
In some jurisdictions, to label resulting injury as "consequential
damage" is to deny compensation for the injury. In others, conse-
quential damage may be as compensable as direct damage. The dif-
ference hinges on the particular phrasing of the constitutional pro-
visions governing the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Thus,
when a constitution is phrased to provide for compensation only
in case of a taking," consequential damage is not compensable. 2
When a constitution requires that the owner be compensated for
taking or damage, 3 recovery may be had for consequential damage.24
It is axiomatic, however, that the inclusion of the word "damage" in
a constitution does not guarantee recovery for every type of conse-
quential damage. 15 Nor does the omission of an affirmative constitu-
tional recognition of the compensability of this type of damage pre-
clude recovery under a statute specifically authorizing such an award.6
The question of consequential damage was early settled in Florida;
the Supreme Court has held that there must be an actual physical in-
vasion for an injury to be compensable under the Florida Constitu-
tion. 7
loSelden v. Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 575, 10 So. 457, 459 (1891) (dictum).
"E.g., FLA. CONsr. Decl. of Rights §12; IOWA CONST. art. I, §18; WIs. CONST.
art. I, §13.
E.g., Selden v. Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891); Fillings v. Potta-
wattamie County, 188 Iowa 567, 176 N.W. 314 (1920); Randall v. Milwaukee, 212
Wis. 374, 249 N.W. 73 (1933). But see Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5
N.V.2d 361 (1942).
'3E.g., CAL. CONsr. art. I, §14; GA. CONsT. art. I, §3; MO. CONST. art. I, §26.
'4E.g., McCandless v. Los Angeles, 214 Cal. 67, 4 P.2d 139 (1931); Macon v.
Daley, 2 Ga. App. 355, 58 S.E. 540 (1907); Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Spring-
field, 346 Mo. 79, 139 S.W.2d 955 (1940).
'
5 See Miramar Co. v. Santa Barbara, 23 Cal.2d 170, 143 P.2d 1 (1943); Archer
v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941).
'61n re Soldiers' and Sailors' Memorial Bridge, 308 Pa. 487, 162 Ad. 309 (1932);
see Pillings v. Pottawattamie County, 188 Iowa 567, 570, 176 N.V. 314, 317 (1920)
(dictum).
17Lewis v. State Road Dep't, 95 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1957); Weir v. Palm Beach
County, 85 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1956); Bowden v. Jacksonville, 52 Fla. 216, 42 So. 394
(1906); Selden v. Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891).
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Nevertheless, severance damage- injury resulting to a remaining
portion of a single tract based on the taking of another portion -is
compensable not only in jurisdictions in which the constitutional pro-
vision covers taking and damage but also, as in Florida, where the
provision is for taking alone. 8 The theoretical basis for allowing
compensation for injury to land remaining to the owner is that the
damage to the remainder area results directly and immediately from
the taking of what was originally an integral part of the land.' 9 "It
is only because of the taking of a part of his land that [the owner]
became entitled to any damages resulting to the rest."' 0
REQUISITES OF SEVERANCE DAMAGE
Two essential factors must be present to permit an award for
severance damage. There must be a taking, and there must be a suf-
ficient relationship between the part taken and the remainder area
to warrant the conclusion that compensation for injury to the latter
would be in effect compensation for the taking.
Taking
The multitude of factual distinctions and theoretical refinements
relied on by the courts in determining when a taking has occurred
are not within the scope of this note. Of necessity, various types of
taking will be indirectly dealt with in considering the second of the
essential elements. It should be recognized that there may be a tak-
ing without formally divesting the owner of his title to the property
or of any possessory interest therein,'21 and that a taking may be ac-
complished by a trespass22 as well as through the medium of statu-
tory eminent domain proceedings. 23 The positions of the courts as
to what facts constitute a taking may vary from the view of some juris-
18 See note 8 supra. Although the severance damage doctrine has long been a
part of Florida case law, the 1957 Legislature gave its blessing to the doctrine by
the enactment of Fla. Laws 1957, c. 57-165.
'9See Stetson v. Chicago & E.R.R., 75 1II. 74, 76 (1874) (dictum).
20Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 371 (1924).
2'United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). See also State Road Dep't v. Tharp.
146 Fla. 745, 1 So.2d 868 (1941).
22See State Road Dep't v. Tharp, supra note 21; Seaboard Airline Ry. v. South-
ern Inv. Co., 53 Fla. 832, 44 So. 351 (1907).
23See FLA. STAT. c. 73 (1955).
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dictions that any limitation on the free use and enjoyment of prop-
erty is sufficient 24 to the view, as expressed by the Florida Court, that
there must be a trespass to or physical invasion of the property.25
Even within a single jurisdiction similar acts of appropriation may
evoke dissimilar conclusions. 26
Single Unit
Difficult questions arise in the process of determining whether the
relationship between the part taken and the remainder area is suf-
ficient to establish a right to recover for severance damage. Employ-
ment of the term "part" is suggestive of the problem: severance dam-
age is compensable only when the portion taken and the damaged
remainder constituted a single unit at the time of the taking.2r
SINGLE UNrr: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
In resolving the problem of what is a single unit, the courts have
several recognized concepts available for manipulation. Two of these,
physical contiguity and unity of use, are theoretically involved in
every instance of partial taking, while a third concept, unity of title,
is of more limited significance. As usual, the cases indicate that the
weight assigned the concepts depends in large part on the result the
court desires.
Physical Contiguity
Physical contiguity is sometimes treated by the courts as an im-
portant factor in determining whether several parcels will be con-
sidered as a unity or as separate tracts. 28 Yet it has been held that a
24E.g., Matter of The Grade Crossing Comm'rs, 6 App. Div. 327, 40 N.Y. Supp.
520 (3d Dep't 1896); Morrison v. Clackamas County, 141 Ore. 564, 18 P.2d 814
(1933); Myer v. Adam, 63 App. Div. 540, 544, 71 N.Y. Supp. 707, 709 (4th Dep't
1901) (dictum).
25Selden v. Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891); cf. Board of Pub. Instr'n
v. Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1955).
26Compare State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So.2d 868 (1941), with
Arundel Corp. v. Griffin, 89 Fla. 128, 103 So. 422 (1925).
27See Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341 (1903).
28E.g., Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber and Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 Pac.
705 (1915); Kansas City, M. S. 0. Ry. v. Littler, 70 Kan. 556, 79 Pac. 114 (1905);
St. Louis, M. & S.R.R. v. Aubuchon, 199 Mo. 352, 97 S.W. 867 (1906).
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canal, 29 a railroad,3 0 or a street 3' running through a tract of land
does not per se create two separate parcels of land. Nor is a tract,
otherwise single, regarded as divided merely because it is bisected by
a lot line32 resulting from platting the property. Thus actual physical
contiguity in the strict sense is not necessarily a condition precedent
to recovery for severance damage.
Unity of Use
To be considered a single tract the several parcels must, as a
general rule, be put to a common use.33 It is the actual joint use of
the several parcels and not the possibility of such use that determines
their unity.'4
Conceptually, both physical contiguity and unity of use should be
present in order for a tract of land to constitute a single unit. In
practical application, however, the absence of one or the other is not
necessarily fatal. Consider the following possibilities. 3 5
Unity of Use Without Physical Contiguity. A nominal separa-
tion caused, for example, by an intervening street, railroad, or water-
course will not preclude an award for severance damage if the parcels
on either side are used together for a single enterprise,36 such as
farming. In determining whether they are used together, mutual ac-
cess between them may be a relevant factor." How far a court will
go in overlooking a physical separation cannot be precisely stated.
One court 3' has held that condemnation of an interest in a wharf and
lumberyard did not entitle the owner to compensation for the re-
sulting injury to his planing mill and plant four hundred feet away,
29Cameron v. Pittsburg & L.E.R.R., 157 Pa. 617, 27 At. 668 (1893).
3OMissouri, K. & N.R.R. v. Schmuck, 79 Kan. 545, 100 Pac. 282 (1909).
"'St. Louis, M. & S.R.R. v. Drummond Realty & Inv. Co., 205 Mo. 167, 103 S.W.
977 (1907).
"2Alabama C.R.R. v. Musgrove, 169 Ala. 424, 53 So. 1009 (1910).
33E.g., Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1944); United States ex
rel. T. V. A. v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Tenn. 1941):
Kossler v. Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. Ry., 208 Pa. 50, 57 At. 66 (1904).
34Kossler v. Pittsburg C.C. & St. L. Ry., supra note 33.
35Unity of title is discussed infra.
3s6See notes 29-31 supra.
37E.g., Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. v. Littler, 70 Kan. 556, 79 Pac. 114 (1905);
Cameron v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 42 Minn. 75, 43 N.W. 785 (1889).
3SOakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber and Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 Pac. 705
(1915).
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separated by property of others but connected by a public street. Yet
in Baetjer v. United States39 separation of an owner's processing plant
from his sugar fields by Vieques Passage, a two-mile-wide body of
water between Puerto Rico and the island of Vieques, did not pre-
clude consideration of the two as a unit. It was held that the owner
was entitled to compensation for the severance damage occasioned
to his processing plant by the condemnation of his sugar fields if
the two formed a single productive unit.
Physical Contiguity Without Unity of Use. When actual physical
contiguity exists, the mere absence of affirmative use of one part of a
tract will not make that part distinct from those sections in use.49
But if one portion of a tract is used for one purpose and another por-
tion for an entirely distinct and separate purpose, the resulting dis-
unity of use will probably preclude an award for severance damage.4 1
Unity of Title
When there is a difference in legal ownership between the part
taken and the part remaining, courts may use a third concept, unity
of title, to limit liability for severance damage. Obviously the land
taken must be owned by the party claiming severance damage. But
is it mandatory that the owner hold the entire tract by the same
estate or interest? Compensation for severance damage was not al-
lowed when an owner was seised in fee of the part taken and was
a joint remainderman of the part not taken.42 Similarly, when a hus-
band owned one of the parcels in fee and held the other jointly with
his wife, recovery for severance damage was denied.43 In Chicago &
E.R.R. v. Dresel,44 however, the remainder area was held in fee and
the part taken was an estate for a term of years, both held by the
condemnee; the owner was compensated for severance damage to his
freehold interest. And even though the condemnee possessed only an
equitable title to one of several contiguous parcels, it was held that
sufficient unity of title existed to permit compensation for severance
30143 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1944).
4aSee David Bradley Mfg. Co. v. Chicago and So. Traction Co., 229 Ill. 170,
82 N.E. 210 (1907).
4lStockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal. App. 760, 31 P.2d 467 (1934) (farm and
service station).
42Conness v. Indiana, I. & I.R.R., 193 Ill. 464, 62 N.E. 221 (1901).
43Glendennihg v. Stabley, 173 Ind. 674, 91 N.E. 234 (1910).
'4110 III. 89 (1884).
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damage.45 The cases suggest that variation in estate or interest may
thwart recovery for severance damage even though the requisite phy-
sical contiguity and unity of use are present.
CONCLUSION
Two conflicting social policies underlie the mass of verbiage that
comprises the doctrine of severance damage: the traditional sanctity
of private property and the desire to prevent undue restrictions on
the state in its activities for the public benefit. The latter policy
found expression in the requirement that there be a "taking" before
compensation was due. Thus a bulwark was erected against claims for
the unavoidable multitude of indirect injuries that flow from the
exercise of eminent domain. To relieve the harshness of denying
recompense for all indirect injury, the courts employed the fiction
that damage to a remainder area resulted from the "taking" and was
therefore compensable. This judicial recognition of the policy of pro-
tecting private interests has been accompanied in many jurisdictions
by political activity culminating in constitutional provisions and
legislative enactments extending the condemnor's liability to other
areas of indirect injury.
Florida, although recognizing the landowner's right to recover
for injuries within the narrow confines of the severance damage
doctrine, has not extended his right to recovery by either constitu-
tional or legislative provisions. Before allowing recovery for indirect
injury through employment of the severance damage doctrine, the
Florida Court requires an actual physical invasion. Once this in-
vasion is established, however, the Court has shown little inclination
to use the physical contiguity, unity of use, and unity of title con-
cepts to limit the availability of the doctrine. 46
There is no doctrine for recovery available to a landowner who
suffers material injury but whose fact pattern does not fall within
the Florida definition of a taking. The possibility of recovery in such
a situation depends on the Florida Court's willingness to expand its
conception of acts constituting a taking. In the absence of this, an
extension of liability must result from legislative enactment or con-
stitutional amendment.
AUBREY V. KENDALL
SHELDON J. PLAGER
45Stockton v. Ellingwood, 96 Cal. App. 708, 275 Pac. 228 (1929).
46No cases were found in which the Florida Court discussed these concepts.
